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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through : 
LAYTON CITY, BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 920483-CA 
v, 
WILLIAM A. ATWOOD, Argument Priority No. 2 
r 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a jury verdict and conviction in the 
Second Circuit Court Layton Department. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (d) , the Utah Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction over criminal appeals from the circuit courts. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court is presented with the following issues on appeal: 
1. Whether Defendant's motion to suppress the blood test 
results of the blood sample drawn to determine the alcohol content 
of Defendant's blood at the time he was operating a motor vehicle 
was properly denied. 
2. Whether the admission into evidence of the blood test, if 
error, was harmless error. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for each of the issues presented is as 
follows: 
1 
Motion to Suppress. This Court reviews the factual findings 
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. The Court 
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on these facts 
under a correctness standard. State v. Gurule, 216 Utah Adv. Rep. 
23 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah 
1992); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991). 
Harmless Error. In reviewing the admission of evidence 
erroneously admitted pursuant to a denial of a motion to suppress, 
the test for harmless error in cases not involving constitutional 
rights is whether, absent the error, there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant. State v. 
Lanier 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 
(Utah 1987); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULE 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-1-30 (1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(5) (a) (1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (1992) 
Utah Admin Code R. 440-12.2 (1992) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was cited for driving under the influence of 
alcohol, a Class "A" misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44(3) (a) and several other traffic offenses. Defendant filed 
a motion to suppress the results of the blood test asserting that 
the blood draw was not conducted in conformance with the 
2 
requirements of § 41-6-44.10(5) (a) and therefore was inadmissable. 
On June 30, 1993, the matter came before the trial court on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. A witness for the prosecution, 
Craig Woodall, an airman from Hill Air Force Base, did not appear. 
Testimony was taken from Deputy Paramedic Neal L. Wagner and the 
matter was argued before the Court. The Court continued the matter 
to give the prosecution the opportunity to produce Craig Woodall. 
A mix-up in scheduling resulted in the Court's not taking testimony 
from Woodall at the continued suppression hearing and ruling on 
Defendant's motion on July 9, 1993, just prior to the scheduled 
jury trial. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress 
and the results of the blood test were ultimately admitted into 
evidence. 
After hearing evidence and argument, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty of driving under the influence. The other 
traffic charges were dismissed. This appeal stems from the trial 
court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress and the subsequent 
jury verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 28, 1992, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Diana Evans, a 
Layton resident, was traveling south in her Astro Van on Adamswood 
Road (approximately 350 North, 1200 East) , a narrow, two lane, un-
lined, curving road in Layton (Evans Transcript, pages 5, 13.) 
(hereinafter "Evans T."). As she rounded a corner in the road at 
a speed of about 20 to 25 m.p.h. (Evans T. 13), she observed a red 
ATV three-wheeler driven by Defendant. Defendant's ATV was 
3 
traveling at a high rate of speed nnd was attempting to maneuver 
the corner. Defendant's vehicle was in Ms, Evans' lane of • J -*vel. 
As Defendant swerved to the right, attempting to return to his lane 
of travel, the ATV tipnp.e •. e , throwing Defendant and a passenger, 
Defendant's 7-8 year O"J daughter, from the vehicle. Ms. Evans 
witnessed the spiiJ ::-a iida to take evasive action, pulling to the 
right and down into a gully to the side of I he road, in order to 
avoid hitting the ATV, Defendant and his daughter. (Evans T. 3-5.) 
Moments after the accident, Ms. Evans made contact with the 
Defendant and his daughter. The Defendant was trying get his 
helmet off but was having a difficult time. Ms. Evans could see 
that Defendant and his daughter w* re injured. However, when Ms. 
Evans indicated she was going to call an ambulance or the police, 
Mr. Atwood strenuous]y objected. (Evans T Ms. Evans had 
the Defendant sit down and contacted l Jit* pu -twood stood 
again and tried to leave the scene by attempting to push his 
vehicle--stii i its side — again stating that he did not want to 
wait for the police to arrive. (Evans T. I.) 
While Ms. Evans was waiting for the police and paramedics to 
arrive, she tried to talk with Defendaiit in hopes of keeping him 
calm and alert. She noticed that his speech was slurred and asked 
if he had been drinking. Defendant indicated he had "a few beers." 
(Evans T. 9.) Officer Grubb was the first officer on the scene. 
When questioned by Officer Grubb, Defendant did not respond. At 
that time, Officer Grubb observed that the Defendant was distant 
and incoherent. (Grubb T. 1, 5-6). 
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Officer Hein arrived and made contact with Defendant shortly-
after the paramedics arrived on the scene. He kneeled behind 
Defendant's right shoulder while the paramedics attended to the 
Defendant. Officer Hein observed at that time that Defendant's 
speech was slurred, that he appeared to be somewhat incoherent and 
that there was a distinct odor of alcohol coming from the 
Defendant. (Hein T". 5) When asked how much alcohol he had consumed 
prior to the accident, the Defendant responded that "he couldn't 
remember." (Hein T. 6) 
Defendant and his daughter were transported to Hill Air Force 
Base Emergency Room at Defendant's request.1 (Atwood T. 14) 
Officer Hein made contact with Defendant at the emergency room and 
observed that the defendant appeared to be much more coherent and 
alert than he had been at the accident scene. Defendant was 
sitting up and conversing with individuals in the emergency room. 
The medical staff were focusing their attention on Defendant's 
daughter. There was no medical personnel working on or attending 
to Mr. Atwood. (Hein T. 10) When Officer Hein asked the Defendant 
how he felt, he stated he was "feeling better." (Hein T. 11.) 
Officer Hein informed the Defendant that he had reason to 
believe that the Defendant was driving under the influence of 
alcohol and asked if he would perform a few tests. The Defendant 
agreed to do so. (Hein T. 11.) Officer Hein administered standard 
field sobriety tests including the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the 
defendant was, at the time, active duty military, stationed 
a Hill Air Force Base. 
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alphabet and the finger count. Based on Defendant's inability to 
satisfactorily perform the tests, Officer Hein concluded that 
Defendant was under the influence of alcohol to an extent he could 
not safely operate a motor vehicle. (Hein 6-9, 11-16.) 
Defendant agreed to submit to a blood draw. After blood was 
drawn from Defendant's arm, Officer Hein asked Defendant several 
questions about Defendant's actions prior to the accident. 
Defendant told Officer Hein that he had drank "quite a bit" and 
that he did not know when he had his first drink or when he had 
stopped. He also stated that he did not know if he was under the 
influence of alcohol and that he had not been involved in an 
accident that day. 
Deputy Neil Wagner, a Deputy Sheriff Paramedic, administered 
the blood test. Deputy Wagner first observed the Defendant in the 
emergency room at Hill Air Force Base. He observed that the 
Defendant appeared to be intoxicated at the time. (Wagner 
Suppression Hearing Transcript, page 12.) (hereinafter Wagner 
"S.H.T.") Deputy Wagner, who is qualified under Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44.10(5)(a) and § 26-1-30 to draw blood (Wagner T. 48), used 
the standard blood draw kit provided to him by Officer Hein. 
(Wagner 50, Hein 17.)2 He was assisted by Craig Woodall, a 
2The kit provides a betadine preparation used to sterilize the 
area from which the blood is to be drawn, a vacutainer, a special 
needle and two blood specimen tubes. Deputy Wagoner described the 
vacutainer as a three inch plastic sleeve with a diameter slightly 
smaller than a quarter. The syringe, which is inserted in the vein 
extends from the closed end of the vacutainer. Blood specimen 
tubes are inserted into the plastic sleeve and when pushed down a 
rubber stopper surrounding another syringe inside the sleeve is 
pushed back and the blood flows into the specimen tube. (Wagoner 
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certified medical laboratory technician stationed at Hill Air Force 
Base (Woodall T. 38, Wagner T. 50).3 
Lab technician Woodall, acting at the direction of an 
emergency room physician (Woodall T. at 39, 42), needed blood to 
complete the Blood Alcohol Test and Complete Blood Count test 
ordered by the attending physician. Woodall and Wagner conversed 
about how best to proceed in a manner that would not require that 
the Defendant be "stuck" twice with the needle. (Wagner S.H.T. 13) 
Woodall applied a tourniquet supplied by the emergency room. 
(Wagner S.H.T. 20.) The vein area was then swabbed with the 
betadine preparation supplied with the state blood kit. Lab Tech 
Woodall, while being observed by Deputy Wagner, performed a 
standard venipuncture or "stick" in Defendant's right arm using the 
vacutainer provided in the state blood draw kit. (Woodall T. 40, 
46, Wagner T. 51, Wagner S.H.T. 16-18.) Deputy Wagner testified 
that the venipuncture was completed in accordance with his own 
paramedic training. (Wagner T. 51-52, Wagner S.H.T. 16-18.) 
After the venipuncture was completed, lab technician Woodall 
used two of the emergency room's specimen tubes to remove the blood 
needed for the hospital's purposes. Deputy Wagner then used the 
S.H.T. 15, Wagoner T. 50-51) Lab technician Woodall referred to 
the apparatus described by Wagoner as the "hub". (Woodall T. 40.) 
Woodall referred to the specimen tubes as "vacutainers." See 
Exhibit 1 in Addendum. 
3Although the record as it now stands before the Court, does 
not reflect whether Woodall was certified under Utah Code Ann. § 
44-6-44(5) to perform blood draws, it was stipulated by counsel for 
both parties that in fact Woodall was not certified under section 
44-6-44(5). The Court should consider the stipulation as part of 
the record. 
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specimen tubes provided in the blood draw kit to withdraw blood for 
DUI testing purposes. (Woodall T. 44-45, Wagner T. 51) . The blood 
sample was submitted to the state toxicology lab by Officer Hein. 
The results of the test showed that Defendant had been driving with 
a blood alcohol level of .30 milligrams of alcohol per one hundred 
milliliters of blood. (Jepson T. 4-5.) 
The defendant testified at trial that he had been preparing 
his ATV for summer use after a winter storage period. He had not 
driven the vehicle since it had been stored several months earlier. 
He testified that he had been drinking beer which he had purchased 
at Hill Air Force Base. Beer available on Base has a 6% alcohol 
content, almost twice the 3.2% alcohol content of the beer which is 
available in Utah. (Atwood T. 11, Jeppson T. 12.) He testified 
that he had been drinking continuously since 12:00 noon. (Atwood 
T. 12) However, he stated that he drank only 4 or 5 beers between 
noon and 5:30 when the accident occurred. Defendant admitted that 
he was basing the numbers on his "usual" consumption. (Atwood T. 
23.) 
Defendant testified that he had problems with the bike's 
throttle prior to winterizing the unit for storage. He claimed 
that the throttle had stuck as he drove around the corner in the 
road and the excessive speed caused the accident. However, he also 
testified that even though he knew of the past problems with the 
bikes throttle, he did not feel at the time that it was 
inappropriate to take his daughter with him on the test ride. 
(Atwood T. 22.) 
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Defendant further testified that he suffered a fractured jaw 
as a result of the accident and extensive internal injuries which 
kept him the hospital for one month. (Atwood T. 16-20) . However, 
he also testified that the emergency room doctor was going to send 
him home after the doctor had verified that Defendant's jaw was 
fractured. It was only after being advised of his release and 
after he had been at the hospital for some time, that he realized 
that he may be suffering from internal injuries and reported his 
discomfort to the doctor. (Atwood T. 16-17.) There was no expert 
medical testimony offered. 
Defendant could not remember many things about the accident or 
his experiences in the emergency room. He did not remember 
speaking with Ms. Evans. He did not remember speaking with the 
officers. He did not remember the blood being drawn. (Atwood T. 
13-16, 23-24.) However, he gave fairly extensive and specific 
testimony about his experiences at the hospital to which he was 
transported from the Base and claimed to recall several life-
threatening situations. (Atwood T. 18-20.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's findings that the blood draw was conducted 
by Deputy Wagner, an individual duly authorized, was not clearly 
erroneous. The facts support the finding and the trial court's 
finding should be upheld. 
The blood draw was conducted in substantial compliance, if not 
strict compliance, with the statue and therefore was properly 
admitted into evidence. Lab Technician Woodall's involvement in 
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the blood draw was minimal. Furthermore, Woodall is clearly 
qualified to hold a permit under the statute, however his unique 
situation in the military makes the permit unnecessary for his 
daily tasks. 
The blood draw results were properly admitted under general 
principals of evidence and pursuant to § 41-6-44.5. Non-compliance 
with the implied consent laws only causes the test results to loose 
the presumption of admissibility. Any competent, relevant 
evidence, including evidence of blood test results, is admissible 
upon the laying of a proper foundation. 
Any error in the admission of the blood test results was 
harmless error as there was other overwhelming evidence of 
Defendant's guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE BLOOD DRAW WAS CONDUCTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) provides that only a 
physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or an individual 
holding a permit issued by the State Health Department may draw 
blood for DUI testing purposes.4 The trial court correctly 
4Section 41-6-44.10(5) (a) provides as follows: 
Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or 
person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the 
request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to 
determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation 
does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath 
specimen. 
Section 26-1-30 reads in pertinent part as follows: 
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concluded that the blood sample in question was drawn by Deputy 
Wagner, an authorized individual. The court found that there is 
much more to drawing blood than simply inserting a needle in a 
person's vein and that the actual blood draw occurred when Deputy 
Wagner placed the vacutainer tube on the second needle. (See 
S.H.T. July 9, 1992, 2-3). 
The facts before this Court support the trial court's 
findings. Although Lab Technician Woodall performed the 
venipuncture, no blood was removed from the Defendant's arm until 
Deputy Wagner placed the vacutainer tubes obtained from the state 
blood-draw kit inside the hub and broke the seal with the needle. 
This Court cannot find that the trial court's findings are 
clearly erroneous on this matter. Therefore, the trial court's 
ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be affirmed and 
Defendant's conviction upheld.5 
(2) In addition to all other powers and duties of the 
department, it shall have and exercise the following 
powers and duties: 
* * * 
(r) establish qualifications for individuals 
permitted to draw blood pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, 
and to issue permits to individuals it finds qualified, 
which permits may be terminated or revoked by the 
department; 
defendant's reliance on Gibb v. Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (Utah 
1975) is misplaced. The statute in question has been amended and 
no longer contains the language relied on by the Defendant in Gibb. 
The pertinent statute at the time the Gibb case was decided read as 
follows: 
Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or 
duly authorized laboratory technician, acting at the 
request of a police officer can withdraw blood for the 
purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content 
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POINT II: THE BLOOD DRAW WAS CONDUCTED IN SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPLIANCE THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 41-6-44.10(5)(a). 
The facts of this case show that the blood draw was conducted 
in substantial compliance, if not strict compliance, with the 
requirements of § 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) . It is clear that the 
legislative intent behind the requirements set forth in § 41-6-
44,10(5) (a) were established not only to protect the health and 
welfare of the person from whom the blood is being drawn but also 
to maintain the reliability of the blood sample itself. The 
legislature wanted to ensure that medically trained and competent 
individuals complete the bloods draws authorized in § 41-6-
44.10(5) (a) using medically acceptable procedures. See State v. 
Barnick, 477 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1991); Greaves v. North Dakota State 
Highway Commissioner, 432 N.W.2d 879 (N.D. 1988); State v. Hanson, 
345 N.D.2d 845, 849-50 (N.D. 1984) 
Lab Technician Woodall's involvement in Defendant's blood draw 
in no way endangered the Defendant or affected the reliability of 
the blood sample. It is clear from his testimony that Lab 
Technician Woodall was qualified to hold a permit from the State 
Health Department.6 He testified that he had completed 15 months 
therein . . . . 
Furthermore, the case should be given little or no weight 
since the Supreme Court, while refraining specifically to overrule 
the case, stated in State v. Durrant, 561 P. 2d 1056 (Utah 1977) 
that the decision is "of small value since it was decided by a 
divided court three to two, and two of the three members who 
favored the decision are no longer with the court . . . ." 
6Rule R440-12.2 of the Utah Administrative Code provides as 
follows: 
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of training and that he was certified with the American Society of 
Clinical Pathologists as a Medical Laboratory Technician. (Woodall 
T. 37-38.) Because of his association with the U.S. Air Force, Lab 
Technician Woodall did not need Utah State certification to perform 
his duties.7 
Deputy Wagner testified that the venipuncture was performed in 
accordance with his own training and experience. All of the 
equipment used in the blood draw--all except the tourniquet which 
R440-12.2 Authorized Individual - Qualifications. 
Pursuant to section 26-1-30(19), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, individuals other than physicians, 
registered nurses, or practical nurses shall meet one of 
the following requirements as a prerequisite for 
authorization to withdraw blood for the purpose of 
determining its alcoholic or drug content when requested 
to do so by a peace officer. 
A. Training in blood withdrawal procedures 
(venipuncture) obtained as a defined part of a 
successfully completed college or university course taken 
for credit, or 
B. Training in blood withdrawal procedures 
(venipuncture) obtained as a defined part of a 
successfully completed training course which prepares 
individuals to function in routine clinical or emeirgency 
medical situations under the guidance of a physician, or 
C. Training of no less than three weeks duration in 
blood withdrawal procedures (venipuncture) under the 
guidance of a licensed physician. 
D. Individuals actively engaged in performing blood 
withdrawal procedures (venipuncture) at the time these 
rules become effective and who have been so engaged for 
a six-month period immediately preceding the effective 
date, but not meeting one of the above requirements, are 
eligible for authorization by a peace officer. 
7The Court should consider that Defendant was taken to the 
hospital at Hill Air Force Base at his own request. It would seem 
to fly in the face of justice to allow Defendant to succeed on his 
claim that a state law was violated because a participant in the 
blood draw who was on a federal installation and subject only to 
federal jurisdiction did not have a state permit. 
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is not provided with the state blood draw kit--came from the state 
blood draw kit. Deputy Wagner, an authorized individual, withdrew 
the blood for blood alcohol testing purposes. 
If this Court finds that the blood draw was not completed in 
strict compliance with § 41-6-44.10(5) (a), then there is sufficient 
evidence to support the finding that the blood draw was completed 
in substantial compliance with that section. The Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
based on the fact that the blood draw was completed in substantial 
compliance, if not strict compliance, with the requirements of § 
41-6-44.10(5) (a) . 
POINT III: THE BLOOD TEST RESULTS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED 
PURSUANT TO § 41-6-44.5. 
Section 41-6-44.5 governs the admissibility of chemical test 
results in action for driving under the influence of alcohol. This 
section specifically states that a court may receive "otherwise 
admissible evidence" regarding a defendant's blood alcohol level at 
the time he was driving.8 Section 41-6-44.5 provides a presumption 
8Section 41-6-44.5 provides as follows: 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a 
chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 
41.6.44.10 are admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two 
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, the test result is admissible as evidence of the 
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the 
alleged operating or actual physical control, but the 
trier of fact shall determine what weight is given to the 
14 
of admissibility of tests conducted in accordance with § 41-6-
44.10(5) (a). Therefor^ tests taken in deviation from § 41-6-
44.10(5)(a) may lose the presumption of admissibility, but may be 
admitted as evidence pursuant to the rules of evidence upon the 
laying of a proper foundation as "otherwise admissible evidence." 
See State v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471 (Colo. 1986) (substantial 
compliance with breath test requirements and proper foundation 
provided for admissibility of test results) ; State v. Drdak, 411 
S.E.2d 604 (N.C. 1992)(blood test not conducted with statutory 
guidelines admissible on other grounds). But See State v. Ibsen, 
735 P.2d 957 (Hawaii App. 1987), State v. Barnick, 477 N.W.2d 200 
(N.D. 1991) and Robertson v. State, 604 So.@d 783 (Fla. 1992) 
(holding suppression proper when blood not drawn by person not 
authorized by law.) 
The Defendant in State v. Sterger, 808 P. 2d 122 (Utah App. 
1991), presented this Court with the exact question Defendant now 
proposes; should the blood test results have been suppressed 
because the blood sample was taken by persons not authorized to 
draw blood pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) . In 
Sterger, this Court found § 41-6-44.10(5) (a) inapplicable, but 
noted that the Court's Oregon counterpart held under similar facts 
that "defects in administering such a test go to the weight to be 
result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from 
receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a 
defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level 
at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control. 
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given its results by the trier of fact, but do not make the results 
inadmissible." Sterger, at 128, n.7.9 
The Prosecution laid the proper foundation for the admission 
of the blood test at trial. Lab Technician Woodall and Deputy 
Wagoner testified regarding the procedure for drawing the blood. 
The chain of evidence was established by testimony and stipulation. 
Barbara Jepson, the prosecution's expert witness, testified to her 
qualifications and experience in analyzing blood specimens and to 
the results of the test. There was sufficient and proper 
foundation for the admission of the blood test results as 
"otherwise admissible evidence." The fact that the test may not 
have been conducted in strict compliance with the law goes to the 
weight to be given the evidence, a decision strictly within the 
providence of the jury. 
This Court should consider that suppression of evidence is a 
drastic remedy and is generally confined to violations of 
constitutional rights. The issue before the Court is one of 
evidentiary admissibility and not constitutional suppression. 
There is no language in the statutes pertaining to DUI drug testing 
that expressly conditions the admissibility of breath or blood 
testing on strict compliance with § 41-6-44.10(5) (a). In fact, § 
9The position is reinforced by the fact that the 1993 
amendments to § 41-6-44.5 added subsection (1)(b) which reads as 
follows: 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 
41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical test 
inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath 
alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when 
prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
16 
41-6-44.5 provides for the admission of other competent evidence. 
The Court should uphold the trial court's denial Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress as there was sufficient foundation to support the 
admission of the blood test results. 
POINT IV: THERE WAS OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL ASIDE FROM THE BLOOD TEST RESULTS TO SUPPORT THE 
DEFENDANT'S DUI CONVICTION. 
Even if this Court finds that the blood test results were 
erroneously admitted into evidence, the Court must find that absent 
the error, the outcome would have been more favorable to the 
defendant. There was overwhelming evidence introduced at trial--
aside from the blood test iresults--showing that Defendant was 
driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he could 
not safely operate a motor vehicle. The evidence showed the 
following: 
1) Defendant was involved in an injury accident. 
2) Defendant had a distinct odor of alcohol about him. 
3) Defendant had drank at least four or five beers with 
a 6% alcohol content prior to the accident. 
4) Defendant showed a lack of judgment in allowing his 
daughter to ride on a bike which he knew had throttle 
problems. 
5) Defendant did not want to have contact with police 
or medical help after the accident. 
6) Defendant did not report his significant injuries to 
the attending physician until he was informed he was to 
be released. 
7) Defendant could not perform simple field sobriety 
tests and showed significant impairment on the horizontal 
gaze nystagmus test. 
This evidence, when considered together, was more than sufficient 
17 
to uphold the jury's verdict of guilty of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. See Gavin v. State, 827 S.W.2d 161 (Ark. 
1992) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial 
Court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Respectfully Submitted this 18th day of January, 1994. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
26-1-30 (2) (r). Powers and duties of department. 
* * * 
(2) In addition to all other powers and duties of the 
department, it shall have and exercise the following 
powers and duties: 
* * * 
(r) establish qualifications for individuals 
permitted to draw blood pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, 
and to issue permits to individuals it finds qualified, 
which permits may be terminated or revoked by the 
department; 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in 
actions for driving under the influence. Weight of 
evidence. 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was operating or in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a 
chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 
41.6.44.10 are admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two 
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical 
control, the test result is admissible as evidence of the 
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the 
alleged operating or actual physical control, but the 
trier of fact shall determine what weight is given to the 
result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from 
receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a 
defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level 
at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control. 
41-6-44.10(1) (a). Implied consent to chemical tests for 
alcohol or drug - Number of tests - Refusal - Warning, 
report - Hearing, revocation of license - Appeal - Person 
incapable of refusal - Results of test available - Who 
may give test - Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state is considered to have given his consent to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for 
the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited 
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under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if the test is or 
tests are administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person to have 
been operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-
44.4, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-
6-44. 
41-6-44.10(5)(a). 
a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical 
nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting 
at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to 
determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation 
does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath 
specimen. 
R440-12.2. Authorized Individual - Qualifications. 
Pursuant to section 26-1-30(19), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, individuals other than physicians, 
registered nurses, or practical nurses shall meet one of 
the following requirements as a prerequisite for 
authorization to withdraw blood for the purpose of 
determining its alcoholic or drug content when requested 
to do so by a peace officer. 
A. Training in blood withdrawal procedures 
(venipuncture) obtained as a defined part of a 
successfully completed college or university course taken 
for credit, or 
B. Training in blood withdrawal procedures 
(venipuncture) obtained as a defined part of a 
successfully completed training course which prepares 
individuals to function in routine clinical or emergency 
medical situations under the guidance of a physician, or 
C. Training of no less than three weeks duration in 
blood withdrawal procedures (venipuncture) under the 
guidance of a licensed physician. 
D. Individuals actively engaged in performing blood 
withdrawal procedures (venipuncture) at the time these 
rules become effective and who have been so engaged for 
a six-month period immediately preceding the effective 
date, but not meeting one of the above requirements, are 
eligible for authorization by a peace officer. 
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